We present PORTHOS, the first tool that discovers porting bugs in performance-critical code. PORTHOS takes as input a program, the memory model of the source architecture for which the program has been developed, and the memory model of the targeted architecture. If the code is not portable, PORTHOS finds a porting bug in the form of an unexpected execution -an execution that is consistent with the target but inconsistent with the source memory model.
Introduction
Porting code from one architecture to another is a routine task in system development. Given that no functionality has to be added, porting is rarely considered interesting from a programming point of view. At the same time, porting is non-trivial as the hardware can influence the semantics of the code in subtle ways. The unfortunate combination of being routine and yet subtle makes porting prone to mistakes. This is particularly true for performance-critical code that interacts closely with the execution environment. Such code often has data races and thus exposes the programmer to the details of the underlying hardware. Concurrency libraries, for example, contain data races to avoid expensive synchronization constructs (barriers, fences, syncs, or cas). When the architecture is changed, the code may have to be adapted to the primitives of the target hardware.
We tackle the problem of porting performance-critical code among hardware architectures. Our contribution is the new (and to the best of our knowledge first) tool PORTHOS to fight porting bugs. It takes as input a piece of code, a model of the source architecture for which the code has been developed, and a model of the target architecture to which the code is to be ported. PORTHOS automatically checks whether every behavior of the code on the target architecture is also allowed on the source platform. This guarantees that correctness of the program in terms of safety properties (in particular synchronization properties like mutual exclusion) carry over to the targeted hardware, and thus the program remains correct after porting.
Semantics and verification under weak memory models have been the subject of study at least since 2007. Initially, the behavior of x86 and TSO has been clarified [15, 44] , then the Power architecture has been addressed [40, 45] , now ARM is being tackled [30] , and the study also looks beyond hardware, in particular C++11 received considerable attention [11, 12] . Research in semantics goes hand in hand with the development of verification methods. They come in two flavors: program logics [49, 50] and algorithmic approaches [1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 13, 14, 23, 24] . Notably, each of these methods and tools is designed for a specific memory model and hence is not directly able to handle porting tasks.
Portability requires an analysis method that is hardwarearchitecture-aware in the sense that a description of the memory models of source and target platforms has to be part of the input. A language for memory models, called CAT, has been developed only recently. In CAT, memory models are defined in terms of relations between memory operations of a program. There are three base relations (program order, reads from, and coherence) that are common to all memory models. A memory model may define further so-called derived relations by restricting and composing base relations. Crucially, the memory model specifies axioms in the form of acyclicity and irreflexivity constraints over the relations. An execution of the program is consistent if it satisfies all axioms. The development of CAT started with [3] , and [9] is the latest definition of its syntax and semantics. CAT comes with the HERD7 tool, one of the few other architectureaware verification tools. HERD7 takes as input a program and a memory model, and acts as a simulator for that memory model. Our work builds on the CAT language and extends the tool landscape by a method to check portability.
PORTHOS performs a precise analysis for acyclic programs. For programs with loops, it is a bounded model checker [18] : it unrolls the cyclic program into an acyclic program of a user-specified depth which, together with the two memory models, is encoded into SMT. Unrolling into an acyclic program rather than a tree avoids an exponential blow-up in the number of paths. The encoding reflects porting bugs in that a satisfying assignment represents an execution which is consistent with the target memory model but inconsistent with the source. There are two problems that make portability different from the safety verification tasks usually tackled with bounded model checking. (i) We have to deal with user-defined memory models. These models may define derived relations as least fixed points. (ii) The formulation of portability involves an alternation (consistent + inconsistent) of quantifiers.
Besides the portability analysis itself, our contributions are efficient SMT encodings to solve (i) and (ii).
Concerning the first problem, we implement in SAT/SMT the operations that CAT defines on relations. Notably, we propose an encoding for derived relations that are defined as least fixed points. Such least fixed points are prominently used in the Power memory model [8] . A naive encoding would implement the Kleene iteration in SAT/SMT by introducing copies of the variables for each iteration step, resulting in a very large encoding. We show how to employ SAT + integer difference logic (IDL) [21] to compactly encode the Kleene iteration process. The idea is that every element in the domain is given an integer variable indicating when it enters the least fixed point solution. It is worth noting that the satisfiability problem for SAT + IDL stays within NP [21] .
The second problem is to encode the quantifier alternation underlying the definition of portability. A porting bug is an execution that is consistent with the target but inconsistent with the source memory model. We show how to capture this alternation with a single existential query. Consistency is specified in terms of acyclicity (and irreflexivity) of relations. Hence, an execution is inconsistent if a derived relation of the (source) memory model contains a cycle (or is not irreflexive). The naive idea would be to model cyclicity by unsatisfiability. Instead, we reduce cyclicity to satisfiability by introducing auxiliary variables that guess the cycle.
The reader may criticize our definition of portability: one could claim that all that matters is whether safety is preserved, even if the executions differ. To be precise, a statebased notion of portability requires that every state computable under the target architecture is already computable on the source platform. We study state portability and come up with two results.
(a) Algorithmically, state portability is beyond SAT.
(b) Empirically, there is little difference between state portability and our notion.
The problem of verifying consistency under weak memory models has been extensively studied. Multiple methods and the complexity of the corresponding problems have been analyzed [17, 28, 29] . A prominent approach is testing where an execution is (partially) given and consistency is tested for a specified model [31, 33] . In this line and concerning (a), we show that state portability (formulated as a bounded analysis for cyclic programs) is Π p 2 -complete. This means there is no hope for a polynomial encoding into SAT (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses). In contrast, our executionbased notion of portability is co-NP-complete (we look for a violation to portability), which in particular means that our portability analysis is optimal in the complexity sense.
Concerning (b), we evaluate our tool on a set of benchmarks and compare the results against state portability. We run HERD7 twice (once for each model) and compare the number of computable states to test state portability. This however will be infeasible for programs with a very large number of computable states. Our experiments show that in most of the cases (especially when testing portability to Power) both notions of portability coincide.
PORTHOS allows us to analyze not only litmus tests, but full programs. We have used it to find portability bugs of mutual exclusion algorithms and the first results evidence the applicability of our method. Interestingly, even if PORTHOS is not complete (it is a bounded model checking approach), bugs are found by unrolling each cycle only once. Our proto-type cannot yet compete in terms of performance with tools that have been under development for years. Yet, our results open the door to integrate portability analysis into tools such as CBMC which have already been used to verify programs under axiomatic memory models [6] .
A problem less general than portability is solved in [13] where non-portable traces from SC to TSO are characterized. The problem is reduced to state reachability under the SC semantics in an instrumented program and a minimal number of fences is synthesized to enforce portability. One step further, one can enforce portability not only to TSO, but also to weaker memory models. The OFFENCE tool [4] does this, but can only analyze litmus test and is limited to restoring SC. Checking the existence of critical cycles (i.e. portability bugs) on complex programs has been tacked in [7] , where such cycles are broken by automatically introducing fences. The cost of different types of fences is considered and the task is encoded as an optimization problem. The MUSKETEER tool analyzes C programs and has shown to scale up to programs with thousands lines of code, but the implementation is also restricted to the case were the source model is SC. Fence insertion can also be used to guarantee safety properties (rather than restoring SC behaviors). The FENDER and DFENCE tools [36, 39] can verify real-world C code, but they are restricted to TSO, PSO, and RMO. More recently, a method that synthesizes programs differentiating two memory models has been proposed [51] . The method reasons about any program while the portability analysis in this paper focuses on a particular program: the differences between memory models are not important as far as they do not impact the program of interest. Their implementation is the only hardware-architecture-aware tool we are aware of besides HERD7 and PORTHOS.
In summary, we make the following contributions.
1. We formulate the portability problem based on the CAT language for axiomatic memory models.
2. We present a bounded analysis for portability. Despite the apparent alternation of quantifiers, our SMT encoding is a satisfiability query of polynomial size and optimal in the complexity sense.
3. We compare our notion of portability to a state-based notion and show that the latter does not afford a polynomial SAT encoding.
4. We present experiments showing that (i) in a large majority of cases both notions of portability coincide, and (ii) mutual exclusion algorithms are often non portable, particularly we perform the first portability analysis from TSO to Power.
Details on the construction and proofs can be found in the appendix. Figure 1 . Portability of program IRIW from TSO to Power.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the portability problem and illustrate the reduction to SAT/SMT on an example. Section 3 defines the programming model and introduces the language CAT for memory models. Portability and the reduction to SAT/SMT is formally treated in Section 4. Section 5 studies the state-based notion of portability. The experiments can be found in Section 6. Section 7 recapitulates the results.
Portability Analysis on an Example
Consider program IRIW in Figure 1 . Threads perform computations on local registers (r 1 ← 1) and access the memory locations x and y to either read their values into registers (r 1 ← x) or write their register values into the memory (y := r 1 ). This program behaves differently when run on x86 than on IBM's Power or ARM. On TSO, the memory model implemented by x86, each thread has a store buffer of pending writes. A thread can see its own writes before they become visible to other threads (by reading them from its buffer), but once a write hits the memory it becomes visible to all other threads simultaneously: TSO is a multi-copyatomic model [20] . Power and ARM on the other hand do not guarantee that writes become visible to all threads at the same point in time. Think of each thread as having its own copy of the memory. With these two architectures in mind, consider the execution in Figure 1 (it only contains the memory accesses but omits thread-local computations). Thread t 1 reads x = 1, y = 0 and t 2 reads x = 0, y = 1, indicated by the solid edges rfe and rf . Since under TSO any execution has a unique global view of all operations, no interleaving allows both threads to read different values of the variables. Under Power, this is possible. Our goal is to automatically detect such differences when porting a program from one architecture to another, here from TSO to Power.
When porting, the developer is confronted with a series of architectures. Our tool PORTHOS applies to various architectures, and we not only have a language for programs but also a language for memory models. The semantics of a program on a memory model is defined axiomatically, following two steps [8, 51] . We first associate with the program (and independent of the memory model) a set of executions which are
fr := rf −1 ; co rfe := rf \ sthd fence := po; id(F); po Figure 2 . TSO.
candidates for the semantics. An execution is a graph (Figure 1 ) whose nodes are occurrences of instructions (events) and whose edges are basic dependencies: the program order po, the reads-from relation rf (giving the write that a load reads from), and the coherence order co (stating the order in which writes take effect). The memory model then defines which executions are consistent and thus form the semantics of the program on that model. We describe memory models in the recently proposed language CAT [9] . Besides the three base relations, a model may define so-called derived relations. The consistency requirements are stated in terms of acyclicity and irreflexivity axioms over (base and derived) relations. The CAT formalization of TSO is given in Figure 2 . It forbids executions forming a cycle over rfe ∪ fr ∪ (po \ (W × R)). The red edges in Figure 1 yield such a cycle, and therefore the execution is not consistent with TSO. Power further relaxes the program order (dotted lines, the formalization is given in Figure 6 ) and considers the execution consistent. Hence, IRIW has more executions on Power than on TSO.
Our contribution is a bounded analysis for portability bugs. It is implemented in the tool PORTHOS available at http://github.com/porthoss/PLDI-2017.
First, the program is unrolled up to a user-specified bound. Within this bound, PORTHOS is guaranteed to find all portability bugs. It will neither see bugs beyond the bound nor will it be able to prove a cyclic program portable. Then the unrolled (acyclic) program, together with the CAT models, is transformed into an SMT formula where satisfying assignments correspond to bugs. Encoding the computations is standard bounded model checking, we use a variant of [19] . Portability comes with two problems for which we propose efficient solutions for: (i) the alternation of quantifiers underlying the problem and (ii) the encoding of user-defined memory models.
Concerning (i), a bug is an execution consistent with the target memory model M T but inconsistent with the source M S . We express this combination of consistency and inconsistency with only an existential quantification. The key observation is that the derived relations, which may differ in M T and M S , are fully defined by the execution. Hence, by guessing an execution we also obtain the derived relations (there is nothing more to guess). Checking consistency for M T is then an acyclicity (or irreflexivity) constraint on the derived relations that immediately yields an SMT query.
Inconsistency for M S requires cyclicity. The trick is to explicitly guess the cycle. We introduce Boolean variables for every event and every edge that could be part of the cycle. In Figure 1 , if Rx1 is on the cycle, indicated by the variable C(Rx1) being set, then there should be at least one incoming and one outgoing edge also belonging to the cycle. Besides the incoming edge shown in the graph, Rx1 could read from the initial value Ix0. Since there are two possible incoming edges but only one outgoing edge, we obtain
If a relation is on the cycle, then also both end-points should be part of the cycle and the relation should belong to the execution:
Finally, at least one event has to be part of the cycle:
The execution in Figure 1 sets every red relation, it yields a cycle and thus a violation of Axiom 2 in TSO ( Figure 2 ). The assignment respects the axioms of Power ( Figure 6 ). Hence, IRIW contains a portability bug from TSO to Power. Concerning (ii), the challenge is to capture relations that are defined recursively as the least solution to a system of equations. Our contribution is an encoding of the Kleene iteration process into (quantifier-free) integer difference logic. IDL has an NP-complete satisfiability problem, and can be translated into SAT with only low-order polynomial blowup. For every recursive relation and every pair of events, we introduce an integer variable Φ r e1,e2 representing the iteration step in which the pair (e 1 , e 2 ) entered the value of relation r. A Kleene iteration then corresponds to a total ordering on these integer variables. Crucially, we only have one Boolean variable r(e 1 , e 2 ) per pair rather than one per iteration step.
We illustrate the encoding on a simplified version of the preserved program order for Power defined as ppo := ii ∪ ic (cf. Figure 6 for the full definition). The relation is derived from the mutually recursive relations ii := dd ∪ ic and ic := cd ∪ ii , where dd and cd represent data and control dependencies. Call Rx1 and Ry0 respectively e 1 and e 2 . The encoding is
We explain the first equivalence, the second is similar. The pair (e 1 , e 2 ) that belongs to relation dd in step Φ dd e1,e2 of the Kleene iteration can be added to relation ii at a later step Φ ii e1,e2 > Φ dd e1,e2 . As ii := dd ∪ ic, the disjunction allows us to also add the elements of ic to ii .
Since dd and cd are empty for IRIW, the relations ii and ic have to be identical. Identical non-empty relations will not yield a solution: the integer variables cannot satisfy
) at the same time. Hence, the only satisfying assignment is the one where both ii and ic are the empty relation, which implies that ppo is empty. This is consistent with the preserved program order of Power for program IRIW.
Programs and Memory Models
We introduce our language for programs and the core of the language CAT. The presentation follows [9, 51] and we refer the reader to those works for details.
Programs
Our language for shared memory concurrent programs is given in Figure 3 . Programs consist of a finite number of threads from a while-language. The threads operate on assembly level, which means they explicitly read from the shared memory into registers, write from registers into memory, and support local computations on the registers. The language has various fence instructions (sync, lwsync, and isync on Power) that enforce ordering and visibility constraints among instructions. We refrain from explicitly defining the expressions and predicates used in assignments and conditionals. They will depend on the data domain. For our analysis, we only require the domain to admit an SMT encoding in a logic which has its satisfiability problem in NP. Also note that we make the locations that reads and writes operate on explicit. This eases the presentation. Our technique can be adapted to support address arithmetic.
For the rest of the paper we will assume that programs are acyclic: any while statement is removed by unrolling the program to a depth specified by the user. Since verification is generally undecidable for while-programs [43] , this underapproximation is necessary for cyclic programs.
Executions
The semantics of a program is given in terms of executions, partial orders where the events represent occurrences of the
ad, dd, cd ⊆ E × E address/data/control dependency sloc, sthd ⊆ E × E same location and same thread
Figure 4. Executions; adapted from [51] .
commands and the ordering edges represent dependencies. The definition is given in Figure 4 . An execution consists of a set of executed events E and so-called base and induced relations satisfying the Axioms 3 -14 . Base relations po, rf and co actually define an execution (they are the ones to be guessed by the solver). Induced relations are divided in two categories: sthd and sloc are equivalences relating events belonging to the same thread 13 and accessing the same location 14 . They can be extracted directly from the source code of the program. Relations ad , dd and cd depend on the choice of po and the program. They represent address, data, and control dependencies. The axioms in Figure 4 are common to all memory models and are natively implemented by our tool. To state them, let R, W, and F represent the reads, writes, and fences in the execution (with R ∪ W ∪ F = E). Reads and writes are memory accesses M := R ∪ W. By R l and W l we refer respectively to the reads and writes that access location l. The events of thread t form the set E t . Axiom 3 , which we do not make explicit, requires the events to form a path in the threads' control flow. Axiom 4 states that the program order po is an intra-thread relation which 5 forms a total order when projected to events in the same thread (predicate total (r, A) holds if r is a total order on the set A). By Axioms 6 and 7 , the readsfrom relation rf gives for each read a unique write to the same location from which the read obtains its value. Here, r 1 ; r 2 := {(x, y) | ∃z : (x, z) ∈ r 1 and (z, y) ∈ r 2 } is the composition of the relations r 1 and r 2 . We write r −1 := {(y, x) | (x, y) ∈ r} for the inverse of relation r. Finally, id (A) is the identity relation on the set A. By Axioms 8 and 9 , the coherence relation co relates writes to the same location, and it forms a total order for each location. We will assume the existence of an initial write event for each location which assigns value 0 to the location. This event is first in the coherence order. Address dependencies are either read-to-read or read-to-write 10 , data dependen- Figure 5 . Core of CAT [9] .
cies are read-to-write 11 , and control dependencies originate from reads 12 .
Memory Consistency Models
We give in Figure 5 a core subset of the CAT language for memory consistency models (MCMs). A memory model is a constraint system over so-called derived relations. Derived relations are built from the base and induced relations in an execution, hand-defined relations that refer to the different sets of events, and named relations that we will explain in a moment. The operators are the standard set-theoretic ones, inverse, transitive closure ( + ), transitive and reflexive closure ( * ), and relational composition. The assertions are acyclicity and irreflexivity constraints over derived relations.
CAT also supports recursive definitions of relations. We assume a set name of relation names (different from the predefined relations) and require that each name used in the memory model has associated a defining equation name := r . Notably, r may again contain relation names, making the system of defining equations recursive. The actual relations that are denoted by the names are defined to be the least solution to this system of equations. To be precise, the domain is the complete lattice of relations over the set of events in the execution of interest. The operations allowed by CAT over relations are immediately checked to be monotone. Hence, a unique least solution is guaranteed to exist by Knaster and Tarski's theorem [48] . As the domain is finite, monotonicity implies continuity and we can compute the least solution with a standard Kleene iteration (starting from the empty relations and iterating until the least fixed point is reached).
In Section 6 we study portability to Power. We use Jade Alglave's formalization of Power in the core of CAT as given in Figure 6 . Power is a highly relaxed memory model that supports program-order relaxations depending on address and data dependencies, that is non-multi-copy atomic, and that has a complex set of fence instructions. The axioms defining Power are uniproc 1 and the constraints 15 to 17 . The model relies on the recursively defined relations ii , ic, ci , and cc. Recall that these are the names that denote the relations obtained as the least solution to the four recursive equations. The fence instructions are captured by the relations sync, lwsync, and cd -isync derived similar to the fence relation in Figure 2 .
Given a program P and an MCM M, an execution X of P is consistent with M if the derived relations of M constructed from the base relations of X satisfy the axioms of M. We denote the set of consistent executions by consistent M (P ). For example, the execution of IRIW shown in Figure 1 satisfies Axioms 1 , 15 -17 , but not 2 . Thus, the execution is consistent with Power but not with TSO.
Portability Analysis
Given a program P and two MCMs M S and M T , our goal is to find an execution which is consistent with M T but not with M S . In such a case P has more executions on the target architecture and we say it is not portable from M S to M T .
Note than if M S is weaker than M T in the sense that for any program, every execution allowed by M S is also allowed by M T , portability boils down to checking that the consistent executions of the program for both MCMs coincide. This is the case for example between SC and TSO, but not between the incomparable RMO and Alpha.
Our method finds non-portable executions as satisfying assignments to an SMT formula. Recall from Section 3.2 that an execution is uniquely represented by the relations po, rf , and co, which need to be guessed by the solver. All other relations are derived from these relations, the source code of the program, and the MCMs in question. Thus. we also have to encode the derived relations of the two MCMs defined in the language of Figure 5 . As the last part, we encode the assertions expressed in the language of Figure 5 on these relations in such a way that the guessed execution is allowed by M T (all the assertions stated for M T hold) while the same execution is not allowed by M S (at least one of the axioms of M S is violated).
The sublogic of SMT we use is integer difference logic, which allows our formulas to be more compact than a pure Boolean encoding. The full SMT formula is of the form
Here, φ CF and φ DF encode the control flow and data flow of the executions, φ M T encodes the derived relations and all assertions of M T , and φ ¬M S encodes the derived relations of M S and a violation of at least one of the assertions of the source memory model.
The control-flow and data-flow encodings are standard for bounded model checking [19] . The control-flow formula captures the branching and merging in the acyclic program. The data-flow encoding relates the values of the variables according to program assignments. For this, we first transform the program into static single assignment form.
15 acyclic(hb) 16 irreflexive(fre; prop; hb * ) 17 acyclic(co ∪ prop) dp := ad ∪ dd rdw := (po ∩ sloc) ∩ (fre; rfe) detour := (po ∩ sloc) ∩ (coe; rfe) ii 0 := dp ∪ rdw ∪ rfi ic 0 := ∅ ci 0 := cd-isync ∪ detour cc 0 := dp
The rest of the section focuses on the parts that are new in this work: how to encode the derived relations needed for representing both the MCMs in Section 4.1, how to encode assertions for the target memory model in Section 4.2, and how to encode assertions for the source memory model in Section 4.3.
Encoding Derived Relations
For any pair of events e 1 , e 2 ∈ E and relation r ⊆ E × E we use a Boolean variable r(e 1 , e 2 ) representing the fact that e 1 r → e 2 holds. We similarly use fresh Boolean variables to represent the derived relations, using the encoding to force its value as follows. Computing a reverse relation requires reversing the events; for the union (resp. intersection) of two relations, at least one of them (resp. both of them) should hold; set difference requires that the first relation holds and the second one does not; for the composition of relations we iterate over a third event and check if it belongs to the range of the first relation and the domain of the second.
We define the transitive closure of r recursively where the base case tc 0 holds if events are related according to r and the recursive case uses a relation composition. These are computed with the iterative squaring technique using the relation composition. Finally reflexive and transitive closure checks if the events are the same or are related by r + . The encodings are summarized below. r −1 (e 1 , e 2 ) ⇔ r(e 2 , e 1 ) r 1 ∪r 2 (e 1 , e 2 ) ⇔ r 1 (e 1 , e 2 ) ∨ r 2 (e 1 , e 2 ) r 1 ∩r 2 (e 1 , e 2 ) ⇔ r 1 (e 1 , e 2 ) ∧ r 2 (e 1 , e 2 ) r 1 \r 2 (e 1 , e 2 ) ⇔ r 1 (e 1 , e 2 ) ∧ ¬r 2 (e 1 , e 2 ) r 1 ;r 2 (e 1 , e 2 ) ⇔ e3∈E r 1 (e 1 , e 3 ) ∧ r 2 (e 3 , e 2 ) r * (e 1 , e 2 ) ⇔ r + (e 1 , e 2 ) ∨ (e 1 = e 2 ) r + (e 1 , e 2 ) ⇔ tc log |E| (e 1 , e 2 ), where tc 0 (e 1 , e 2 ) ⇔ r(e 1 , e 2 ), and tc i+1 (e 1 , e 2 ) ⇔ r(e 1 , e 2 ) ∨ (tc i (e 1 , e 2 ); tc i (e 1 , e 2 )).
Encoding Recursively-Defined Relations: Recall that some of the relations (e.g. ii and ic of Power) can be defined mutually recursively, and that we are using the least fixed point (smallest solution) semantics for cyclic definitions. A classical algorithm for solving such equations is the Kleene fixpoint iteration. The iteration starts from the empty relations as initial approximation and on each round computes a new approximation until the (least) fixpoint is reached. Such an iterative algorithm can be easily encoded into SAT. The problem of such an encoding is the potentially large number of iterations needed, and thus the resulting formula size can grow to be large.
A more clever way to encode this is an approach that has been already used in earlier work on encoding mutually recursive monotone equation systems with nested least and greatest fixpoints [34] , a framework more expressive than the one used in this work. The encoding of this paper uses an extension of SAT with integer difference logic, a logic that is still NP complete and supported by the SMT solver natively. A SAT encoding is also possible but incurs an overhead in the encoding size: if the SMT encoding is of size O(n), the SAT encoding is of size O(n log n) [34] . The encoding is also closely related to [35, 41] which encodes logic programming under the stable model semantics. They also use a least fixed point semantics for recursive definitions encoded into integer difference logic and SAT. While the basic encoding idea is not new, the application of the approach to encoding axiomatic memory models is novel, and can be of interest to other researchers for efficiently encoding, e.g. Power memory model semantics using an SMT solver.
The basic idea of the encoding is to guess a certificate that contains the iteration number in which a tuple would be added to the result relations in the Kleene iteration. For this we use additional integer variables and enforce that they actually locally follow the propagations made by the fixed point iteration algorithm. Thus, for any pair of events e 1 , e 2 ∈ E and relation r ⊆ E × E we use a fresh integer variable Φ r e1,e2 representing the round in which the variable would be derived by the Kleene iteration algorithm. Using these fresh variables we guess the execution of the Kleene fixed point iteration algorithm, and then locally check that every guess that was made is also a valid propagation of the fixed point iteration algorithm. For a simple example on how the encoding for the union of relations needs to be modified to also handle recursive definitions, consider a definition where r 1 := r 2 ∪ r 3 and r 2 := r 1 ∪ r 4 . The encoding of such a mutual recursive definition is as follows e1,e2∈E
If both r 3 and r 4 happen to be empty relations, the r 1 and r 2 relations need to become identical. Also, any candidate solution where both relations are non-empty is not a solution, as in particular the integer variables will not have any solution where
e1,e2 ) hold at the same time. Thus, the only satisfying assignment for the encoding is the one where both r 1 and r 2 are empty, which is the correct least fixed point semantics.
Encoding Target Memory Model Assertions
For the target architecture we need to encode all acyclicity and irreflexivity assertions of the memory model. This can be done with a conjunction. For handling acyclicity we again use non-Boolean variables in our SMT encoding for compactness reasons. One can encode that a relation is acyclic by adding a numerical variable Ψ e ∈ N for each event e in the relation we want to be acyclic. Then acyclicity of relation r is encoded as
Notice that we can impose a total order with Ψ e1 < Ψ e2 only if there is no cycle. Our encoding is the same as the SAT + IDL encoding in [32] where more discussion of SAT modulo acyclicity can be found.
The irreflexive constraint is simply encoded as irreflexive(r) ⇔ e∈E ¬r(e, e).
Encoding Source Memory Model Assertions
For the source architecture we have to encode that one of the derived relations does not fulfill its assertions. On the top level this can be encoded as a simple disjunction over all the assertions of the source memory model, forcing at least one of the irreflexivity or acyclicity constraints to be violated. For the irreflexivity violation, we can reuse the same encoding as for the target memory model simply as ¬irreflexive(r). What remains to be encoded is cyclic(r), which requires the relation r to be cyclic. Here, we give an encoding that uses only Boolean variables. We add Boolean variables C(e) and C r (e 1 , e 2 ), which guess the edges and nodes constituting the cycle. 1 We ensure that for every event in the cycle, there should be at least one incoming edge and at least one outgoing edge that are also in the cycle:
C r (e 1 , e 2 ))).
If an edge is guessed to be in a cycle, the edge must belong to relation r, and both events must also be guessed to be on the cycle:
(C r (e 1 , e 2 ) ⇒ (r(e 1 , e 2 ) ∧ C(e 1 ) ∧ C(e 2 ))).
A cycle exists, if these formulas hold and there is an event in the cycle:
State Portability
Portability from M S to M T requires that there are no new executions in M T that did not occur in M S . One motivation to check portability is to make sure that safety properties of M S carry over to M T . Safety properties only depend on the values that can be computed, not on the actual executions. Therefore, we now study a more liberal notion of so-called state portability: M T may admit new executions as long as they do not compute new states. Admitting more executions means we require less synchronization (fences) to consider a ported program correct, and thus state portability promises more efficient code. The notion has been used in [36] .
The main finding in this section is negative: a polynomial encoding of state portability to SAT does not exist (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses). Phrased differently, state portability does not admit an efficient bounded analysis (like our method for portability). We remind the reader that we restrict our input to acyclic programs (that can be obtained from while-programs with bounded unrolling). For whileprograms, verification tasks are generally undecidable [43] .
Fortunately, our experiments indicate that new executions often compute new states. This means portability is not only a sufficient condition for state portability but, in practice, the two are equivalent. Combined with the better algorithmics of portability, we do not see a good motivation to move to state portability.
A state is a function that assigns a value to each location and register. An execution X computes the state state(X) defined as follows: a location receives the value of the last write event (according to co) accessing it; for a register, its value depends on the last event in po that writes to it.
The relationship between the notions is as follows. We turn to the hardness argumentation. To check state portability, every M T -computable state seems to need a formula checking whether some M S -consistent execution computes it. The result would be an exponential blow-up or a quantified Boolean formula, which is not practical. But can this exponential blow-up or quantification be avoided by some clever encoding trick? The answer is no! Theorem 2 shows that state portability is in a higher class of the polynomial hierarchy than portability. So state portability is indeed harder to check than portability.
The polynomial hierarchy [46] contains complexity classes between NP and PSPACE. Each class is represented by the problem of checking validity of a Boolean formula with a fixed number of quantifier alternations. We need here the classes co-NP = Π
The tautology problem (validity of a closed Boolean formula with a universal quantifier ∀x 1 . . . x n : ψ ) is a Π P 1 -complete problem. The higher class Π P 2 allows for a second quantifier: validity of a formula (∀x 1 . . . x n ∃y 1 . . . y n : ψ) is a Π P 2 -complete problem. Theorem 2 refers to a class of common memory models that we define in a moment. Moreover, we assume that the given pair of memory models M S and M T is non-trivial in the sense that consistent M T (P ) ⊆ consistent M S (P ) fails for some program, and similar for state portability. By Theorem 2.(2), state portability cannot be solved efficiently. The first part says that our portability analysis is optimal. We focus on this lower bound to give a taste of the argumentation: given a non-trivial pair of memory models, we know there is a program that is not portable. Crucially, we do not know the program but give a construction that works for any program. The proof of Theorem 2. (2) is along similar lines but more involved. Definition 3. We call an MCM common if (i) the inverse operator is only used in the definition of fr , (ii) the constructs sthd , sloc, and set × set are only used to restrict (in a conjunction) other relations, (iii) it satisfies uniproc (Axiom 1 ) , and (iv) every program is portable from this MCM to SC.
Notice that all memory models considered in [8] and in this paper are common ones.
We explain the definition. When formulating a MCM, one typically forbids well-chosen cycles of base relations (and fr ). To this end, derived relations are introduced that capture the paths of interest, and acyclicity constraints are imposed on the derived relations. The operators inverse and set × set may do the opposite, they add relations that do not correspond to paths of base relations (and fr ). Besides stating what is common in MCMs, Properties (i) and (ii) help us compose programs (cf. next paragraph). Uniproc is a fundamental property without which an MCM is hard to program. Since the purpose of an MCM is to capture SC relaxations, we can assume MCMs to be weaker than SC. Properties (iii) and (iv) guarantee that the program P ψ given below is portable between any common MCMs.
The crucial property of common MCMs is the following. For every pair of events e 1 , e 2 in a derived relation, (1) there are (potentially several) sequences of base relations (and fr ) that connect e 1 and e 2 , and (2) the derived relation only depends on these sequences. The property ensures that if we append a program P to a location-disjoint program P , consistency of composed executions is preserved.
It remains to prove Π P 1 -hardness of portability. We first introduce the program P ψ that generates some assignment and checks if it satisfies the Boolean formula ψ(x 1 . . . x m ) (over the variables x 1 . . . x m ). The program P ψ := t 1 t 2 consists of the two threads t 1 and t 2 defined below. Note that we cannot directly write a constant i to a location, so we first assign i to register r c,i . We reduce checking whether ∀x 1 . . . x m : ψ(x 1 . . . x m ) holds to portability of a program P ∀ψ . The idea for P ∀ψ is Table 1 . Bounded portability analysis of mutual exclusion: portable (), non-portable (), does not apply (-).
this. First P ψ is run, it guesses and evaluates an assignment for ψ. If ψ is not satisfied (y = 1), then some non-portable program P np is executed. The program P ∀ψ is portable iff the non-portable part is never executed. This is the case iff ψ is satisfied by all assignments. Let M S , M T be common and non-trivial. By nontriviality, there is a program P np = t 1 · · · t k that is not portable from M S to M T . We can assume P np has no registers or locations in common with P ψ . Program P ∀ψ prepends P ψ to the first two threads of P np . Once y = 1, P np starts running. Formally, let t 1 and t 2 be the threads in P ψ and let t i := skip for 3 ≤ i ≤ k. We define P ∀ψ := t 1 · · · t k with t i := t i ; r ← y; if(r = 1) then t i .
We show that P ∀ψ is portable iff ψ is satisfied for every assignment by proving the following: if P ∀ψ is not portable then ψ has an unsatisfying assignment and vice versa.
Experiments
The encoding from Section 4 has been implemented in a tool called PORTHOS which uses Z3 [25] as the back-end SMT solver. In this section we evaluate PORTHOS on benchmark programs on a wide range of well-known MCMs. For SC, TSO, PSO, RMO and Alpha (henceforth called traditional architectures) we use the formalizations from [3] . We also compare two Power models, the one in Figure 6 taken from [8] and a previous slightly different version from [5] , henceforth called CAV10 and formalized in Figure 9 .
We divide our results in three categories: Section 6.1 discusses portability of mutual exclusion algorithms, SecDeadness SC-TSO  2  898  100  933  65  SC-PSO  26  777  197  836  138  SC-RMO  26  737  237  780  194  SC-Alpha  26  846  128  887  87  TSO-PSO  24  833  143  883  93  TSO-RMO  24  760  216  798 Table 2 . Portability vs. State Portability on litmus tests. tion 6.2 portability of litmus tests, and Section 6.3 the performance of the tool.
Portability of Mutual Exclusion Algorithms
The other tools that are MCM-aware [8, 51] [47] . The benchmarks also include previously known fenced versions for TSO (marked as X86) and new versions we introduced using Power fences (marked as POWER). The mutual exclusion program loops were unrolled once in all the experiments to obtain an acyclic program, and the discussion in what follows is for the portability analysis of this acyclic program.
While these algorithms have been proven correct for SC, it is well known that they do not guarantee mutual exclusion when ported to weaker architectures. The effects of relaxing the program order have been widely studied; there are techniques that even place fences automatically to guarantee portability, but they assume SC as the source architecture [7, 13] . In this section we do not only confirm that fenceless versions of the benchmarks are not portable from SC to TSO and fenced versions of them are (1 st column of Table 1 ), we also show that those fences are not enough to guarantee mutual exclusion when ported from TSO to Power (5 th column of the table). Figure 7 . Deadness [51] . models are different, such differences are subtle enough not to be exhibited for those particular programs at the analyzed bounded depth. Even though previously known fenced versions of the benchmarks guarantee mutual exclusion on TSO (and even on PSO for most programs), that guarantee is lost when porting to Power (except for PARKER X86). We have used PORTHOS to find portability bugs when porting from TSO to Power and manually added fences to forbid such executions (see benchmarks marked as POWER). To the best of our knowledge these are the first results about portability of mutual exclusion algorithms from memory models weaker than SC to the Power architecture.
Checking Portability on Litmus Tests
We compare the results of PORTHOS (which implements portability) against HERD7 (http://diy.inria. fr/herd) which reasons about state reachability and can be used to test state portability. HERD7 systematically constructs all consistent executions of the program and exhaustively enumerate all possible computable states. Such enumeration can be very expensive for programs with lots of computable states, e.g. for many programs with a very large level of concurrency. Since HERD7 only allows to reason about one memory model at a time, for each test we run the tool twice (one for each MCM) and compare the set of computable states. The program is not state portable if the target MCM generates computable states that are not computable states of the source MCM.
Our experiments contain two test suites: TS 1 contains 1000 randomly generated litmus tests in x86 assembly (to test traditional architectures) and TS 2 contains 2427 litmus tests in Power assembly taken from [40] . Each test contains between 2 and 4 threads and between 4 and 20 instructions.
Portability vs State Portability. For very small programs, such as the litmus tests, sometimes the new executions allowed by the target architecture do not create new computable states of the program. Table 2 reports the number of non-portable (w.r.t. both definitions) litmus tests (), the number of portable and state-portable litmus tests () and the number of litmus tests that are not portable but are still state portable (). In the last case the new executions allowed by the target memory model do not result in new computable states of the program. We will show that in many cases both notions of portability coincide. For TS 1 on traditional architectures, the amount of non state-portable tests is very low (1.38%), while the non portability of the program
wo(ppo) := (((rfe; ppo; rfe) \ id(E)); co) ∪ (rfe; ppo; fr init ) Figure 8 . Multi-copy atomicity [51] .
does not generate a new computable state in 13.97% of the cases. For TS 2 from traditional architectures to Power, the number of non state-portable litmus tests rises to 31.93%, while only in 6.16% of cases the two notions of portability do not match because the new executions do not result in a new computable state for the program. In order to remove some executions that do not lead to new computable states, PORTHOS optionally supports the use of dead executions which has been recently proposed in [51] . Dead executions are either consistent or lead to not computable states. Formally an execution X is dead if
Instead of looking for any execution which is not consistent for the source architecture, we restrict the search to non-consistent and dead executions of M S . Dead executions can be approximated with constraints 18 ? represents the reflexive closure of r , and imm(r) = r \ (r; r + ). These constraints can be easily encoded into SAT. Our tool has an implementation which rules out quite a few executions not computing new states. The last two columns of Table 2 show that by restricting the search to dead executions, the ratio of litmus tests the tool reports as non portable, but are actually state portable is reduced to 10.77% for traditional architectures and to 4.44% for Power.
Multi-copy Atomicity. Multi-copy atomicity (MCA) is a property of MCMs that ensures that different threads cannot observe writes in conflicting order in the absence of threadlocal reordering, i.e. there is an unique copy of memory that serializes all writes [20] . It has been axiomatically defined for the first time in [51] where the authors systematically show there exists no program containing at most 6 events which differentiates between TSO and MCA. This is consistent with TSO satisfying the MCA property. The model is given in Figure 8 and comprises write/write coherence 20 and the acyclicity of the write order relation wo which is parametrized by the preserved program order relation ppo 21 . Here fr init is the projection of fr over the events that read from an initial write.
In order to test their axiomatic definition of MCA we performed an experiment which consists of 1000 randomly generated litmus tests with up to 30 events and we have not found any counterexample. We also tested MCA for Power on TS 2 and found several counter-examples (e.g. a variation of IRIW) showing that Power is not an MCA model.
Consistent CAV 10
1 acyclic((po ∩ sloc) ∪ rf ∪ fr ∪ co) 22 acyclic(co ∪ fr ∪ dp ∪ absync ∪ ablwsync) dp :
Comparing Power models. The CAV10 model in Figure 9 is a slightly semantically different formalization of Power that has a simpler definition than the most recent version shown in Figure 6 . It only considers that events in the program order related by data/control dependencies or isync instructions are guaranteed to be preserved. The model uses recursive definitions and composition of relations to model cumulativity of fences (absync and ablwsyn relations) and is formalized by the uniproc Axiom 1 and constraint 22 in Figure 9 . We have run PORTHOS to test portability both from Power to CAV10 and from CAV10 to Power on TS 2 . As explained in [8] , both Power models are not comparable since there exist tests that violates portability in both directions.
Our tool found such examples on TS 2 . However, both models seem to be sound w.r.t. hardware.
Performance
For small litmus test, the running times of HERD7 outperform PORTHOS. However, as soon as the programs become bigger, HERD7 does not perform as well as PORTHOS. We believe this is due to the use of efficient search techniques in the Z3 SMT solver. The impact on efficiency is manifested as the number of executions HERD7 has to explicitly simulate by enumeration grows. We evaluate the solving times of our tool on the mutual exclusion benchmarks. Our prototype encoding implementation is done in Python; the encoding generations times are on the average 31.3 s with a minimum of 1.1 s and a maximum of 160.6 s. The encodings involving Power are usually more time consuming than traditional models since Power has both transitive closures and least fixed points in its encoding. We expect that the encoding times could be vastly improved by a careful C/C++ implementation of the encoding. Figure 10 presents the solving times of PORTHOS (using Z3) for the mutual exclusion algorithms, which are actually much lower than the encoding times for our prototype implementation. For most of the cases it takes less than 10 secs; exceptions are LAMPORT POWER and all SZYMAN-SKI versions when testing portability to Power. For most of such cases the programs are portable which correspond to the encoding being UNSAT, which typically is harder for SAT/SMT solvers than finding a satisfying truth assignment. See for example SZYMANSKI X86 for RMO-Power Figure 10 . Solving times (in secs.) for mutual exclusion algorithms.
and Alpha-Power which takes more time than the other models combinations. Solving times for traditional models are faster than those of Power by one order of magnitude.
Conclusions
We introduce the first method that tests portability between any two axiomatic memory models defined in the CAT language. The method reduces portability analysis to satisfiability of an SMT formula in SAT + integer difference logic. We propose efficient solutions for two crucial tasks: reasoning about two user-defined MCMs at the same time and encoding recursively defined relations (needed for Power) into SMT. Our complexity analysis and experimental results both suggest that our definition of portability is preferable over the state-based notion of portability. If state-based portability is required, the complexity results show that it can not be done with a single SMT solver query, unlike the approach to portability analysis suggested in this paper. We also show that our method is not restricted just to litmus tests that have no branching structure but actually for the first time report on automated tool-based portability analysis of mutual exclusions algorithms from several axiomatic memory models to Power.
A. Rest of the encoding
This section details the remaining two sub formulas for the portability encoding, i.e. the control-flow and the data-flow.
A.1 Control-flow
Instead of representing the branching of the program with a tree [22] , we use a direct acyclic graph (DAG) capturing the branches of the program and how those merge again. This allows to keep the size of the control-flow formula linear w.r.t the (unfolded) program. The tree representation can be exponential if the program has several if statements. We encode this DAG in the formula φ CF .
For each instruction 2 i we use a Boolean variable cf i representing the fact that the instruction is actually executed by the execution. For a sequence i 1 := i 2 ; i 3 , instruction i 1 belongs to the execution iff both i 2 and i 3 belong too (1) . Assignments (local computations, loads and stores) and fences do not impose any restriction in the control-flow encoding (2)- (5); belonging or not to the execution depends on them being part of the body of some if statement at a higher level of the recursive definition. Given an instruction i 1 := if b then i 2 else i 3 , we use three control-flow variables cf i1 , cf i2 , cf i3 ; then i 1 is executed iff one of i 2 , i 3 is performed (6), which one actually depends on the value of b and this is encoded in the data-flow formula φ DF . These restrictions are encoded recursively by the following constraints:
A.2 Data-flow
We encode the data flow with single static assignments using the method of [19] . Formula φDF represents how the data flows between locations and registers; we first focus on how the data-flow of the local thread behavior is encoded (sub-formula φDF thrd ). For each location of the program (resp. register) we use several integer variables (one for each variable in the SSA form of the program) representing the value carried by that location (resp. register) in the execution. For loads, stores and local computations, if the instruction is part of the execution (i.e. its control-flow variable is True) then both sides of the assignment should coincide (7)- (9) . For a sequence, the formula is the conjunction of the encoding of the corresponding instructions (10) .
Suppose register r and location l have been already assigned p and q times respectively, then:
Following the SSA form, the left hand side of each assignment introduces new variables; for registers in the right hand side, indexes are not updated so they match with the last value which can only be modified by the same thread (9) . However for locations in the right hand side, the index is also updated (8) to allow variables to match not only with the last assignment done by that thread, but also from other threads (see the sub-formula φDF mem below).
If statements may have a different number of assignments in their branches for certain variables. The idea here is to insert dummy assignments to ensure that both branches have the same number of assignments. We show the encoding for the simple case where each branch consists only of local computations to a register r. The same process is applied individually for each register and location assigned in a branch. If the branches contain if statements, the procedure must be applied recursively to each of them. Consider the if statement if b then i1 else i2 where the first branch has less assignments to r than the second one, i.e. i1 := r ← e1,1; . . . ; r ← e1,p and i2 := r ← e2,1; . . . ; r ← e2,q with p < q (the encoding is symmetric for q < p). Assume r has been already assigned x times, then the encoding of the instruction contains the following constraint:
. . .
Constraint (11) imposes that which branch is followed depends on the value of the predicate. Next, we specify how the value of r is updated depending on the branch: if the first branch is taken, then the value of r is updated according to the expressions the first p times (12)- (13) and it remains unchanged for the remaining q − p assignments (14); if the second branch is taken, the value of r is updated according to the corresponding expressions in that branch (15)- (16) . By adding constraints which keep assignments unchanged, we can easily model how branches merge again since any variable assigned after the if statement would be matched with the last value assigned to that variable. Since fresh variables are added for locations in both sides of the assignments (8) , their values are not yet constrained. We now specify how the data flows between instructions that access locations in the shared memory (possibly in different threads). This depends on where the values are read-from (i.e. the rf relation) and is encoded by constraints DFmem (i1, i2). A write instruction l := r generates data-flow constraint cf l:=r ⇒ (li = r) and a read r ← l is encoded by cf r←l ⇒ (r = lj). The variables li, lj remain unconstrained. If both instructions (call them i1 and i2) are related over the rf relation, then their values need to match:
Finally, the data-flow between register and location either within or between threads is encoded as:
where it represent the instruction at the highest recursive level of the thread.
B. Complexity Proofs
We recall the main theorem and the program P ψ := t1 t2 from the paper: Lemma 2. P ψ is portable from every common MCM to another common MCM.
Proof. According to property (iv), any common MCM is portable to SC. In SC, an execution corresponds to an interleaving of the two thread executions. First, the threads create some variable assignment A which is read by t1. Then, t1 checks whether the assignment satisfies ψ. If it does, y is set to 2, otherwise y is set to 1.
We show that any consistent execution of some common MCM is SC-consistent by examining possible executions.
• If wi,1 co → wi,0 and wi,0 rf → ri, then this corresponds to an interleaving where wi,1 occurs first, then t1 writes wi,0 and reads 0 (ri).
• If wi,0 co → wi,1 and wi,0 rf → ri, then wi,0 and ri in t1 occur first and then wi,1.
• If wi,0 co → wi,1 and wi,1 rf → ri, then t1 writes wi,0, t2 overwrites this with wi,1 and afterward t1 reads 1 with ri.
• If wi,1 co → wi,0 and wi,1 rf → ri, then the derived relation fr := rf −1 ; co satisfies ri fr → wi,0. Since wi,0 and ri are related by po and access the same location there is a cycle wi,0 po∩sloc −→ ri fr → wi,0. This is a violation of uniproc, the situation can not occur in a common MCM.
So we can construct a corresponding interleaving for any execution of a common MCM. It follows that every execution of a common MCM is SC-consistent and according to property (iv) consistent with any common MCM.
We use the following technical lemmas to show hardness. We call the relations po, rf , co, ad , dd , cd and fr basic. Given a common MCM, we define the violating cycles as follows: For an assertion acyclic(r), any cycle of r is violating. For an assertion irreflexive(r), any cycle of the form e r → e is violating. The following lemma shows that an execution is not consistent if it contains a violating cycle.
Lemma 3. Let M be common. An execution X is consistent with M iff X contains no violating cycle of M.
This follows directly from the definiton of violating cycles. We say a relation r satisfies the path condition if e1
Lemma 4. Any relation r of a common MCM satisfies the path condition.
Proof. Note that the recursively defined relations of a common MCM can be obtained with a Kleene iteration. We use a structural induction over the Kleene iteration. Induction Basis: Any named relation is initially the empty relation and trivially satisfies the path condition.
Induction
Step: Assume all named relations satisfy the path condition. A named relation is updated according to its defining equation using the current assignments of the named relations and basic relations. To simplify this proof, we can assume that any equation only contains one operator or a relation in base. Any basic relation trivially satisfies the condition. Let r1 and r2 satisfy the path condition. We examine the operations that can be applied to them according to properties (i) and (ii) of common MCMs. We see that r1 ∪ r2, r1 ∩ r2, r1 ∩ sloc, r1 ∩ sthd, r1 ∩ set × set , r1 \ r2 all satisfy the path condition. The relation r1; r2(e1, e2) requires an event e3 with r1(e1, e3) and r2(e3, e2) and since r1 and r2 satisfy the path condition there is a path from e1 to e3 and from e3 to e2 and thus r1; r2 also satisfies the path condition. Similarly, r + 1 adds a relation only where there already is a path and satisfies the path condition. Relation r * 1 consists of r + and the identity relation, which also satisfies the path condition (there is always a path of length 0 from some e1 to e1). A named relation still satisfies the path condition after a Kleene iteration step.
Note that according to Lemma 4, a violating cycle implies a cycle of basic relations (called a basic path) that contains all events of the violating cycle. We can argue about consistency of an execution by examining the paths of basic relations.
Lemma 5. Given a relation r of a common MCM and events e1, e2 of an execution, whether r(e1, e2) holds is determined by the basic paths from e1 to e2.
Proof. We use a structural induction over the Kleene iteration.
Induction Basis: Any named relation is initially the empty relation and trivially satisfies the condition. Any basic relation trivially satisfies the condition.
Step: Assume all current assignments of relations are determined by the basic paths between related events. Two events e1 and e2 are related by some relation r iff the basic paths from e1 to e2 satisfy some property. A named relation is updated according to its defining equation using the current assignments of the named relations and basic relations.
The relation r1; r2 relates e1 to e2 if there is an e3 such that the basic paths from e1 to e3 ensure r1(e1, e3) and the basic paths from e3 to e2 ensure r1(e3, e2). It follows that r1; r2(e1, e3) depends on the basic paths from e1 to e2 over some e3. The relations r * 1 and r + 1 are derived using previously examined operators over relations and thus they satisfy the condition.
A named relation still satisfies the path condition after a Kleene iteration step.
Proof of Theorem 1.1. We show that P ∀ψ is not portable iff ψ has an unsatisfying assignment.
(⇒): We assume an execution X exists that is MT -consistent but not MS-consistent. According to Lemma 3, the execution has a violating cycle for MS. We assume towards contradiction that no event of Pnp is executed. The read r ← y in t 1 has to read from the write in t1 (in P ψ ) according to uniproc (the execution is MT -consistent). It occurs after t1 in the program order. The read has incoming basic relations from events in P ψ but no outgoing relations to some event in P ψ . Any read r ← y in another thread can either read from the write in P ψ (it has an incoming rf relation from P ψ ) or it reads the initial value which results in an outgoing from-read relation to P ψ . There are no other basic relations between a read r ← y and some event in P ψ . So any read r ← y has either basic incoming relations from P ψ (rf , po) or outgoing to P ψ (f r), not both.
It follows from Lemma 4, that no read r ← y has both incoming and outgoing derived relations and so no read r ← y is in a violating cycle. Any violating cycle is in P ψ . Further, there is no basic path from some event e1 in P ψ to one of the reads and back to some e2 in P ψ . The reads do not affect the basic paths between events in P ψ . So the violating cycle for MS is still present if we remove the reads and thus restrict the execution to events of P ψ . Since removing the reads does not affect the basic paths in P ψ , no violating cycle for MT has been added. It follows that the execution of P ψ is consistent with MT but not MS. This is a contradiction to P ψ being always portable for common MCMs (Lemma 2).
It follows that any violating cycle requires events from Pnp to be executed. Since an event of Pnp can only be executed if y = 1 was read in the thread (and thus written by t1), the if-condition in Line 8 was not satisfied. It follows that there is an assignment that does not satisfy ψ.
(⇐): We now assume that there is an assignment that doesn't satisfy ψ. There is an SC-consistent execution Z of P ψ that executes the write y := rc,1. We extend this execution of P ψ to an execution X of P ∀ψ : We ensure that all reads r ← y read from y := rc,1 and thus Pnp is executed. Let Y be an execution of Pnp that is MT -consistent but not MS-consistent. This results in an execution X ⊃ Y ∪ Z of P ∀ψ that contains the executions of P ψ and Pnp, the read from relation for the reads of y and the required program order additions. Since Pnp has no registers or locations in common with the rest of the program and occurs last in po, no basic relation of X leaves Y . It follows that X contains the same basic paths between events of Y as Y . Thus the violating cycle for MS in Y is also in X. It follows that X is not MS-consistent. We show that X is still MT -consistent. We assume towards contradiction that there is a violating cycle for MT : As before, it holds that a violating cycle must contain an event from Y . Since Y is never left, any basic cycle of X with events in Y must be contained entirely in Y . It follows from (Lemma 4) that a violating cycle for MT must be entirely in Y . This is a contradiction to the execution of Pnp being MT -consistent.
Since P ∀ψ is a polynomial-time reduction, portability is Π P 1 -hard.
B.1 Π P

-Completeness of State Portability
We introduce Lemma 6 and Theorem 3 in order to show that state portability is both in Π P 2 and is Π P 2 -hard. It follows, that state portability is Π P 2 -complete for common MCMs and thus Theorem 2.2 is correct.
Lemma 6. State-based portability is in Π2 for all MCMs.
Proof. We encode the state portability property in a closed formula (i.e. all variables are quantified) of the form ∀∃ψ. We have already shown how to encode consistency of an execution X with an MCM M as a formula (X ∈ consistentM(P )) in Section 4. Again we encode numbers as sequences of Boolean variables. Let val(e) be the value that is read/written by a read or write event e and loc(e) the location it accesses. We can encode the property state(X) = σ in a Boolean formula as follows. If a write has no outgoing co relation, then it must have the same value as the location in the state:
In a similar way we can ensure that the last operation in the program order on a register r has the value σ(r). This means we can construct Boolean formulas for properties of the form X ∈ consistentM(P ) and state(X) = σ. With this, we can construct the following formula:
This is equivalent to state portability (see Definition 2) . The state portability problem from MS to MT can be expressed as a closed quantified formula of the form ∀∃ψ and thus state based portability is in Π P 2 .
We now introduce the program P ψ and examine its behavior. We will then use P ψ in order to prove Π P 2 -hardness. Let ψ(x1 . . . xm) be a be a Boolean formula over variables x1 . . . xm. The concurrent program P ψ := t1 t2 with two threads t1 and t2 is defined below. The program is similar to the program in the previous section. It contains additional synchronization in order to ensure that the formula assignment and the computed state match. The program either computes a satisfying assignment of ψ (y = 1), an unsatisfying assignment (y = 0) or it ends with an error (y = 2).
We use the value 0 to encode the Boolean value false. To avoid confusion, we assume that the variables are initialized with some other unused value, e.g. 3. This does not interfere with the validity of the proofs since our program only assigns constants and thus 0 and 3 are interchangeable.
We will see that it is sufficient to examine the program under SC (the strongest common MCM) where an execution is an interleaving of the two thread executions. The threads first create some variable assignment A; thread t1 assigns 0 to the variables and t2 assigns 1. The assignment A is determined by the interleaving of those writes. If the write xi := 0 of t1 is followed by xi := 1 of t2 (wi,0 co → wi,1), then xi is set to 1. Then t1 ensures that t2 has executed all its writes (so that the assignment doesn't change anymore) by using the synchronization variables x 1 . . . x m to check that t1 and t2 reads the same assignment. If that is not the case, then some writes of t2 have not occurred yet and y is set to 2 in Line 6. If all the writes from t2 have occurred, t1 checks whether A satisfies ψ (y is set to 1) or not (y is set to 0). To simplify our study we will define a state only over its locations, not the registers. This does not change the complexity of the state portability problem: We could simply add instructions to our input programs that write all registers to locations in the end.
We can use our simpler notion of states without registers on the input program with the added instructions to solve the original state portability problem with registers.
An assignment A of a set of Boolean variables V is a function A ⊂ V × {0, 1} that assigns either 0 or 1 to a variable. We lift the definition accordingly to
The program P ψ can compute some assignment A with y = 1 or y = 0 depending on whether A satisfies ψ.
The following lemmas show that P ψ behaves similar for all common MCMs.
Lemma 7. Let M contain uniproc and A be an assignment of ψ. It holds A |= ψ (resp. A |= ψ) only if
Proof. We show that any M-consistent execution with y = 0 or y = 1 computes a desired state. Let X be an execution that satisfies uniproc and computes some σ with σ(y) = 1 (σ(y) = 0 is analogue). Since y := 1 is executed in t1, it follows that ψ is satisfied by the values of x1 . . . xm read by r1 . . . rm in Line 4 and also r 1 , . . . , r m in Line 3 read the same values. We call this assignment A. Since the reads of Line 5 of t2 occur after the writes w1 . . .wm they are ordered last in co according to uniproc. The execution computes 3 for x 1 . . . x m .
It remains to show that the writes accessed by r1 . . . rm are indeed computed by X, meaning they are ordered last in co. Towards contradiction, we assume this is not the case. Then, there is a write wi,1 or wi,0 that is accessed by a read but its value is not computed (it is not last in co). This cycle is a contradiction to X satisfying uniproc which is property (iii) of common MCMs.
Case 2: Assume that there is a write wi,0 that is read (wi,0 rf → ri) and its value is not computed (wi,0 co → wi,1). It follows that ri reads the value 0. Since y = 1 is computed, the condition in line 8 is not satisfied and since val(ri) = val(r i ), we know that r i also reads 0. This means r i reads not the initial value 3 so it must read from wi. For the writewi that r i reads from (wi rf → r i ) follows that val(wi) = val(r i ) = 0. According to the data-flow,wi writes the value that was obtained by the previous readri which must be 0 Proof. Given some assignment A, we can easily construct an SCconsistent execution where the writes to x1 . . . xn are interleaved according to the assignment (wi,0 co → wi,1 if xi is satisfied). Then t2 reads those values and writes them to x 1 . . . x n . Now t1 reads x 1 . . . x n and the if-condition in line 5 is not satisfied, we go in the else-branch. So t1 sets y to 0 or 1 depending on whether A |= ψ and t2 sets x 1 . . . x n back to the initial value 3. It follows that for every assignment A, there is a SC consistent execution X that computes σ[A; y ← 0] or σ[A; y ← 1] depending on whether A satisfies ψ. Since any SC-consistent execution is consistent with all common MCMs, we can compute the desired state for any assignment of ψ. The other direction follows diretly from Lemma 7.
In order to show Π P 2 -hardness, we reduce validity of a closed formula ∀x1 . . . xn∃y1 . . . ym : ψ to state portability. The idea is to construct a program that uses P ψ in order to check if some assignment satisfies ψ and then overwrite y1 . . . ym with 1 so that the assignment of y1 . . . ym is not given by the computed state. If ψ was not satisfied, the non-portable component Pnp is executed. If the execution of Pnp is MT -consistent but not MS-consistent, then it pretends that the formula was satisfied by setting y to 1. This means, that under MT , any assignment of x1 . . . xn with y = 1 can be computed. It follows that the program is portable if any assignment of x1 . . . xn with y = 1 can be computed under MS. Under MS however, pretending is not possible. Here P ψ can only be set to 1 by P ψ . So under MS, an assignment of x1 . . . xn and y = 1 can only be computed if there is some assignment of y1 . . . ym so that ψ is satisfied. The program is portable if ∀x1 . . . xn∃y1 . . . ym : ψ holds.
We want a simple non portable program that always computes the initial state except under MT , where it can set a location z to 1. We use a program Pnp = t 1 · · · t k with the following properties: Any execution consistent with MS computes 3 for all its locations and contains no write that sets z to 1. The MTconsistent executions compute either z = 1 or z = 3 and 3 for all other locations. The program contains only one write to z which is in t 1 .
We assume the state portability problem from MS to MT is not trivial and a program exists that has an MT -consistent execution such that no MS-consistent execution computes the same state σ. We can assume that the program only assigns constant values and has no write on z.
Similarly to the synchronization of P ψ , we can add a mechanism at the end of all threads that does the following: all threads check if they read σ; if so, they communicate that to t1 which sets z accordingly and then all threads set all other locations back to 3. It follows that a program Pnp with the required properties exists.
Given y := rc,1 ; // and pretend ψ was satisfied. 9 y1 := rc,1; · · · ym := rc,1 ; // Overwrite y1..ym assignment.
Let ti := skip for i ≤ 3 ≤ k (t1 and t2 are from P ψ ). The threads are defined for 2 ≤ i ≤ k as t s i := ti; ry ← y; if (ry = 0) then t i .
In general terms, Ps does the following: First, it executes P ψ . If the state computed by P ψ did not satisfy ψ (y = 0), then it executes Pnp, which is not portable. If the execution of Pnp is MT , but not MS-consistent (z = 1), then Ps pretends, that the formula was satisfied by setting y to 1. Afterward, y1 . . . ym are set to 1, so that their former assignment checked in P ψ is no longer given by the computed state. Proof. According to Lemma 8, the following holds: For every assignment A of x1 . . . xn and A of y1 . . . ym, there is an MTconsistent execution X of P ψ , such that either state(X) = σ[A ∪ A ; y ← 1] or state(X) = σ[A ∪ A ; y ← 0]. We examine both cases:
and according to Lemma 8 there is an SC-consistent execution of P ψ that computes σ[A ∪ A ; y ← 1]. We can easily extend this to an SC-consistent execution X (represented by an interleaving) of Ps. After P ψ is executed, we read 1 with reads ry ← y of all threads. So the subsequent if conditions are not satisfied. Then we execute the writes in Line 9. So y1 := rc,1 . . . ym := rc,1; are the only writes executed outside of P ψ . These writes are ordered after the assignments of 0 to y1 . . . ym in co and thus state(X )(yi) = 1 for i ≤ m. Since there are no further executed writes outside of P ψ , the computed state otherwise coincides with σ[A ∪ A ; y is executed in t1. We construct an execution X ⊃ X of Ps in the following way: We ensure all reads ry ← y of threads t s i with i ≤ k read from y := rc,0 and thus all threads t i are executed. This means Pnp is executed. According to the definition of Pnp, there is an MT -consistent execution Y of Pnp such that state(Y )(z) = 1 is written by some write wz in t 1 and Y computes the initial value for all other locations of Pnp. We enforce X ⊇ Y and ensure the read rz ← z reads from the write in Pnp (z = 1) and thus the following if condition is satisfied and the writes z := 3 and y := 1 are executed. We order them last in co. It follows that X computes σ[A; y, y1 . . . ym ← 1]
We show that X is still MT -consistent. We partition the events of X into sets E1, E2 and E3 and show that there is no violating cycle of MT inside or between these sets.
Set E1 consists of events in X and the subsequent reads ry ← y of all threads. Set E2 consists of the events of Y . Set E3 contains the events rz ← z in t1 and the following writes z := rc,3, y := rc,1 and y1 := rc,1; · · · ym := rc,1.
The following two conditions hold: (i) E2 is only left by basic relations leading to E3. This is the case since E1 precedes E2 in the program order and has no common registers. (ii) There are no basic relations leading from E3 to some other set: The events in E3 are ordered last in the program order and the writes are ordered last in the coherence order. The read rz ← z has no outgoing f r relation, since there is only one write to z.
From (i) and (ii) follows that X contains no basic cycle that contains events from more than one of the sets. According to the path property (Lemma 4) exists no violating cycle for MT in X that contains events from more than one of the sets. So any violating cycle must be contained entirely in one of the sets.
From (i) and (ii) follows (iii): If two events e1, e2 are in the same set, then there is no basic path from e1 to e2 that leaves the set.
We consider E1: There are read from relations from y := rc,0 in t1 to all reads ry ← y in t s i with i ≤ k. However, there are no outgoing basic relations from any of those reads to other events in E1. It follows from (iii) that there is no basic path from a read y := rc,0 to another event in E1 and according to the path property, there is no relation from a read y := rc,0 to some other element in E1. It follows that a read ry ← y cannot occur in a violating cycle. From (iii) follows that the basic paths in X between events of E1 (and thus the violating cycles for MT ) are the same as in X. Since X is MT -consistent, it has no violating cycle for MT and thus X has no violating cycle for MT in E1.
We consider E2: From (iii) follows that the basic paths in X between events in E2 are the same as in Y . According to Lemma 5, X has a violating cycle for MT in E2 iff Y has a violating cycle for MT . The execution Y is defined to be MT -consistent so there is no violating cycle in E2.
We consider E3: The set contains no basic cycle and no basic relation leaves E3 according to (ii). It follows that there is no basic cycle that contains events of E3. According to the path property, there is no violating cycle in E3. It follows that X is MTconsistent.
Lemma 10.
There is an MS-consistent execution of Ps that computes σ[A; y, y1 . . . ym ← 1] with some assignment A of x1 . . . xn iff there is an assignment A of y1 . . . ym such that A ∪ A |= ψ.
Proof. If a program P is contained in a program P , we can restrict an execution X of P to an execution of P . We simply remove all events and relation on events that are not in P . We denote X restricted to P as X[P ].
(⇒): Let X be an MS-consistent execution of Ps that computes state(X)(y) = 1. We assume towards contradiction that X contains a write that sets z to 1. According to the definition of Pnp the execution X[Pnp] contains a violating cycle for MS. As with the proof of Lemma 9, we can show that no basic path in X between events of X[Pnp] leaves X [Pnp] . It follows that the basic paths between events in X[Pnp] are the same in X and X[Pnp] and thus X also contains the violating cycle for MS. This is a contradiction to X being MS-consistent.
It follows that X cannot read z = 1 in Line 5 and the write in Line 8 is not executed. So y := rc,1 must have been executed in P ψ for X to compute y = 1.
The execution X satisfies uniproc since MS is common. It has no basic cycle that violates uniproc. It follows that X[P ψ ] has no such basic cycle either and thus satisfies uniproc. It follows from Lemma 7, that X[P ψ ] computes a satisfying assignment of x1 . . . ym. Since nothing is written to x1 . . . xn outside of P ψ , X computes the same values for x1 . . . xn as X[P ψ ]. A write yi ← rc,0 in t1 is related to write yi ← rc,1 in line 9 of t s 1 in po ∩ sloc and according to uniproc also in co. This implies that X computes 1 for y1 . . . ym. For the synchronization variables of P ψ , uniproc ensures that X computes the initial values.
It follows, that if there is an MS-consistent execution that computes σ[A; y, y1 . . . ym ← 1] for some assignment A of x1 . . . xn, then there is an assignment A of y1, ..ym such that A ∪ A |= ψ.
(⇐): According to Lemma 8, for each assignment A of x1 . . . xn and A of y1 . . . ym where A ∪ A satisfies ψ, there is an SC-consistent execution X of P ψ such that state(X) = σ[A ∪ A ; y ← 1]. This SC execution of P ψ can be represented as an interleaving of the local executions. To this interleaving, we append the subsequent reads ry ← y. They read the value 1 and the next if conditions are not satisfied. Then we append the remaining writes in line 9. The resulting interleaving represents an SC-consistent execution X of Ps .
The only writes not in P ψ that are executed by X are in Line 9 (they are last in the program order and thus also last in po ∩ sloc) and according to uniproc, they must be ordered after any write yi := 0 in co. It follows state(X ) = σ[A; y, y1 . . . ym ← 1].
Theorem 3. State-based portability is Π2-hard for common MCMs.
Proof. Given common MCMs MS and MT , we argue that Ps is a reduction of validity of a formula ∀x1 . . . xn∃y1 . . . ym : ψ(x1 . . . ym) to state portability from MS to MT Note that any execution of Ps satisfying uniproc computes 1 for y1 . . . ym and the initial values for the synchronization variables. We show that the following properties (i)-(iii) hold:
(i) Any state with y = 2 that is computable with an MT -consistent execution of Ps can be computed by an MS-consistent computation of Ps. It is easy to see that any state with y = 2 that can be computed by an execution satisfying uniproc, can be computed by an SC-consistent execution.
(ii) Any state with y = 0 that is computed by an MT -consistent execution X of Ps can be computed by an MS-consistent computation. 
